OBJECTIVES-To determine the extent of a group A streptococcus (GAS) cluster (2 residents with invasive GAS (invasive case-patients), 2 carriers) caused by a single strain (T antigen type 2 and M protein gene subtype 2.0 (T2, emm 2.0)), evaluate factors contributing to transmission, and provide recommendations for disease control.
Case Finding
The following records were reviewed to identify additional cases: GAS culture results collected from September 1, 2014 , to March 20, 2015 , from two laboratories that process resident specimens; SNF resident infection logs from January 1 to March 31, 2015; and employee absentee logs (January 1-March 11, 2015) to identify any staff members with sick leave potentially associated with GAS infections (e.g., those reporting upper respiratory infections or pharyngitis). A self-administered survey was also distributed to all staff members, including night shift and part-time staff, who worked primarily in resident care areas (e.g., certified nursing assistants (CNAs), registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), physicians, housekeeping staff, physical therapists). The survey included questions about occupation, duration of employment, type of resident contact, location of work, hand hygiene practices, and signs and symptoms associated with GAS infection (sore throat; rash, open wound, or skin infection; fever, cough, or other respiratory infections) from January 1, 2015, through the day of survey administration (March 19-24).
Colonization Study
Residents and staff were swabbed to determine the prevalence of GAS colonization and to identify unrecognized sources for ongoing transmission. Oropharyngeal swabs were obtained from staff members who worked in resident care areas and all residents present at the SNF on March 19, 2015 . Wounds from residents with open skin lesions were swabbed. Swabs were sent to the CDC Streptococcus Laboratory in Atlanta for culture. If GAS was isolated, the isolate underwent antibiotic susceptibility testing and typing for T antigen and emm. 8 
Epidemiological Investigation and Infection Control Assessment
Potential epidemiological links between GAS case-patients and carriers were looked for by reviewing medical records and room assignments of GAS culture-positive residents and the work schedule of staff who reported being ill with streptococcal pharyngitis between January 19 and March 19, 2015 (2 weeks before hospitalization of the first case until date of colonization assessment).
To assess infection control (IC) practices, SNF IC policies were reviewed, and staff members were interviewed. IC practices (including hand hygiene, wound care, and transmission-based precautions) of nurses on all four units performing patient care were also observed using CDC hand hygiene and wound care assessment tools. 9 The observer arrived unannounced to shadow day-shift staff members completing their duties. Staff members were aware of the purpose of the observation but were not aware of the specific practices being observed.
Ethics
These activities were part of a public health response and were determined to be "nonresearch." Therefore, CDC institutional review board review was not required.
RESULTS

Case Characteristics and Case Finding
Descriptive epidemiology of the four residents from whom GAS was initially isolated (two invasive case-patients, two carriers) is shown in Table 1 (Residents 1-4) . The first invasive case-patient (Resident 1) died while hospitalized for GAS bacteremic pneumonia. The second invasive case-patient (Resident 2) developed GAS bacteremia after being hospitalized for percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy replacement. Resident 2 died 2 weeks after being discharged back to the SNF; it is unclear whether death was related to GAS infection. Review of laboratory records and resident infection log from the investigation did not identify any additional invasive or noninvasive GAS cases in SNF residents.
Colonization Study
One oropharyngeal swab was collected from each of the 167 residents at the facility and 49 wound swabs from 33 residents with wounds (33/167, 19.8%); two wound cultures from one resident grew GAS (Table 1 ; Resident 5). This resident had been negative for GAS during the first swabbing that SNF staff conducted in February. These and the four isolates previously collected from the residents (Residents 1-4) were all T2, emm2.0.
From March 19 to 24, an oropharyngeal swab was collected from each of the 162 staff members; GAS was isolated from two members (1%). None of the staff members disclosed presence of skin lesions on the day of the survey. The T and emm types differed (T12, emm12; T1, emm1.25) from that of the GAS cases and colonized residents. A 10-day course of cephalexin 10 was given to the three carriers identified through the survey; the resident was placed on contact precaution, and staff members did not report to work during the first 24 hours of treatment. Repeat cultures were all negative.
All five residents meeting the case definitions (two invasive case-patients, three carriers) were located in two adjacent units, A and B.
Survey of SNF Staff
Self-reported illnesses related to GAS infection are summarized in Table 2 . Of 34 staff with sore throats, six reported being diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis. Four of the six (1 RN, 1 LPN, 4 CNAs) had less than 1 year of employment at the SNF. Laboratory results confirming GAS pharyngitis were not available for five of the six who reported being diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis. All six individuals reported receiving antibiotics; four received treatment appropriate for GAS pharyngitis (e.g., penicillin, amoxicillin, clindamycin). The epidemic curve for 14 staff members whose date of onset of sore throat was available, including three of the six diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis, is presented in Figure 1 .
Of the 54 (33%) staff members who reported an episode of sore throat, respiratory infection, or both since January 1, 25 (46%) reported missing work for their illness (median 2 days, range <1-8 days), including five of the six staff members diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis (median 4.5 days, range 3-6 days).
A focused review of the work schedule of the six staff members diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis revealed that two worked primarily in the unit where both case-patients resided (Unit A), and both reported GAS pharyngitis in the 2 to 3 weeks before the illness onset of the two invasive case-patients. One of these staff members had direct patient contact with both invasive case-patients before the onset of the residents' illnesses. Although both staff members missed work after receiving a diagnosis of GAS pharyngitis, records indicated that the staff member who had direct contact with both case-patients had worked while symptomatic. None of the six who reported GAS pharyngitis had GAS isolated during the colonization study, but all had received antibiotic treatment for their illnesses. The two additional staff members colonized with different GAS strains showed no epidemiological link to the case-patients.
Infection Control
Staff observations revealed that hand hygiene was performed more often after resident contact than before (45 (68.2%) occurrences out of 66 hand hygiene opportunities before resident contact vs 61 (91.0%) occurrences out of 67 opportunities after resident contact). Hand hygiene lapses, including failure to wash hands or apply alcohol-based hand rub, were observed before individuals putting on gloves (7/21 missed hand hygiene opportunities), before and after limited resident contact such as delivering medication or a food tray (10/21 missed hand hygiene opportunities), and after contact with objects in the hallways between resident rooms. In the survey, few staff members (2.6%) reported not using gloves when changing wound dressings or bathing residents.
Nurses (RNs, LPNs) appeared to have better hand hygiene performance than other occupations, and staff members with longer length of employment at the facility (5-10 years) had better hand hygiene performance than those with shorter lengths of employment (<1 year). Staff members with fewer years of experience were also observed to be less familiar with the wound care protocol than more-experienced staff. These individuals made frequent trips back and forth from the wound care supply cart for forgotten items and took items into resident rooms inappropriately, which may have caused cross-contamination of equipment and increased opportunities for GAS transmission. Differences were observed in the cleaning and disinfection method of shared wound care equipment, such as scissors (e.g., soap and water, alcohol, surface disinfectant wipes, multiple combinations of these), suggesting that a standardized cleaning protocol was not effectively implemented. At least one staff member who was known to have GAS pharyngitis before the onset of cases was found to be unfamiliar with wound care procedures.
DISCUSSION
A small but fatal cluster of invasive GAS infections at a SNF is described. The evidence suggests that a sick healthcare worker might have introduced the infection, which was subsequently transmitted to other residents as a result of breaches in infection control practices; two staff members were ill with GAS pharyngitis in the few weeks before the onset of the two invasive case-patients and worked in the units where the two invasive casepatients resided, and one staff member who reported working after illness onset had direct contact with both invasive case-patients. It was not possible to observe or review documentation of staff infection control practices while individuals were actively ill and working, but observation of lapses in hand hygiene and wound care during the public health investigation suggests that breaches were occurring in the weeks before the initial case. The new acquisition of GAS colonization that matched the emm type of the case-patients by a resident who had a previous culture-negative wound specimen further supports ongoing transmission in the facility due to lapses in infection control.
Although lapses in infection control may have propagated transmission within this facility, this investigation highlights a unique aspect of infection control: the role of sick healthcare workers in introducing an outbreak pathogen. "Presenteeism," the opposite of absenteeism, is a term used to refer to employees working while ill. 11, 12 Most literature about presenteeism addresses its effect on employee productivity and employer finances, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] but in a healthcare setting, this practice can also affect disease transmission.
Despite many reports of GAS outbreaks in long-term care facilities such as SNFs and nursing homes, only a few studies identified sick healthcare workers as a possible source of infection. 18, 19 Addressing presenteeism among staff members of long-term care facilities with GAS infection can be challenging. Prevention of presenteeism first requires that staff realize the risk to others while working ill; therefore, presenteeism may be more likely to occur when individuals experience mild illness. 20 While symptoms of GAS in otherwise healthy staff members can be mild (e.g., pharyngitis, respiratory symptoms), 19, 21 this organism can result in invasive disease if transmitted to a vulnerable population such as residents of long-term care facilities, 7 where risks for severe GAS infections (e.g., advanced age, crowded living conditions, breaks in the skin, and underlying illnesses), 7 are common. Second, previous reports have shown that workers at long-term care facilities may be more susceptible to presenteeism. A Swedish study found that nursing home aides were most prone to presenteeism (65%) compared to all other occupations surveyed, perhaps reflecting this occupation's low hierarchical position, limited job and financial security, 11 and low workload flexibility. 20 Factors contributing to presenteeism can vary among different types of healthcare workers, including status within an organization, staffing needs, job and financial security, and expectations or pressure from supervisors. 22 Workplace policies could influence staff members' decision to come to work ill, thus, facility management should consider developing policies that are realistic and that encourage staff to comply with rules against presenteeism. One example is a "paid sick leave" policy, which was demonstrated to be associated with a decrease in communicable disease outbreaks in a study of nursing homes. 23 Minimizing requirements to get paid sick leave (e.g., requiring certification from a clinician) may also help discourage presenteeism. 22 Given the challenges in preventing presenteeism among staff members who are sick with GAS, these efforts should be coupled with an increased level of awareness by the health facilities to respond promptly whenever an invasive GAS case patient is identified, such as by reviewing IC practices and conducting active surveillance to identify sick staff members or other residents colonized with GAS to prevent further transmission and development of serious disease among other vulnerable individuals.
The results of this investigation are subject to several limitations. First, since we did not have the information on T and emm types of GAS strains from the two staff members who were diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis prior to the resident infections, we were unable to prove that these were the same strain. However, we considered that the epidemiological evidence was strong enough to suggest that GAS was transmitted by infected staff. Second, since the colonization assessment was performed more than a month after the cluster occurred, the results may not be representative of the GAS colonization at the time of the cluster. Last, the lag time in the investigation may have resulted in recall bias in the staff survey.
Despite these limitations, this investigation highlights how staff presenteeism may contribute to transmission of disease, especially in a long-term care facility. Encouraging staff to avoid working while ill should be a priority in all healthcare settings, especially nursing homes and other long-term care facilities, to prevent the introduction of infectious diseases into a vulnerable population. Solutions for presenteeism should include educating staff on the harms of presenteeism, promoting staff identification and reporting of any illness symptoms, and implementing sick leave policies that support staff decisions to avoid working when sick. Epidemic curve of onset of sore throat among surveyed staff members in the staff survey, January 1-March 24, 2015, including those reporting provider-diagnosed group A streptococcal (GAS) pharyngitis (n = 14), with date of onset available is shown. Two provider-diagnosed GAS pharyngitis cases occurred before the onset of invasive GAS casepatients, as shown in the epidemic curve (*). GAS pharyngitis indicates staff members with provider-diagnosed GAS pharyngitis. c Resident 2 was transferred to different rooms in Units A and B during the stay at the skilled nursing facility (SNF) and was hospitalized from January 17 to 29 for pneumonia due to methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and February 6 to 12 for PEG replacement. GAS bacteremia was identified after PEG replacement.
d GAS from Residents 3 and 4 were detected from a colonization assessment conducted by the SNF and from Resident 5 from the assessment by the investigation team. P = private room; CHD = chronic heart disease; CKD = chronic kidney disease; D = double occupancy; CVA = cerebrovascular accident; BKA = below-knee amputation; DM = diabetes mellitus; PVD = peripheral vascular disease.
